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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN TRAFFIC CASES
ROBERT GREENWALD
Speed and drinking are the two most influential
factors contributing to deaths on the highways. In
1966, over 50,000 persons in the United States lost
their lives as a result of traffic accidents.' Of the
fatal accidents which occurred, speed was a con-
tributing factor in 35% of the cases.2 Suggestions
have been made that alcohol is causally related to
approximately 50% of fatal accidents in the United
States.3
Even such conservative estimates4 as those
quoted above, indicate the necessity for prosecut-
ing speeding and drinking motorists before they
cause harm to themselves or others. Successful
prosecution may well depend on the means for
determining when an offense is committed. Scien-
tific research has provided these means.
1 NADAR, UNsAz AT ANY SPEED vii (1965).
259 Tizmric SAFSY 25-27 (No. 6, Dec. 1961).
3 Borkenstein and Crowther, TnA_ rc DIGEST AND
REv. 12(6):4 (1964).
4 Ehrman, Causes of Highway Accidents, The United
States Experience, 12-1 TuRmic QuART.RLY 35-36
(Jan. 1958) relates reports from twenty-one states in
1955 which established that (1) three out of ten drivers
were violating a speed law; (2) half of these drivers were
exceeding stated speed limits; (3) half were exceeding
safe speed limits. DONIGAN, CHnmcALr TEsTs AnD
THE LAw 1 (1966) discusses a survey in nineteen
California counties establishing that of 1,134 drivers
killed in motor vehicle accidents, about 55% had been
drinking prior to their accident. In all car accidents,
69% had been drinking.
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VnnICULAR SPEED
Several scientific methods have been developed
to determine the speed of a moving vehicle. The
photo-traffic camera is a device which "takes two
photos, at a set time interval apart, of a moving
vehicle. The distance traveled, by the car, in that
interval, from a fixed point, is the basis for a mathe-
matical computation of the rate of speed." I The
Prather speed device, or electric timer, "consists of
a control panel which contains a stop watch, a
switch, and a reset button. In addition, there is a
cable 500 feet long that plugs into the box. There
are two rubber tubes which stretch the width of the
street." 6 They are activated by the wheels of pass-
ing cars so that the time the car takes to pass from
one to the other of the hoses is measured by the
stop watch. The speed is then mathematically
computed.
The most common speed detection device used
by law enforcement agencies is the radar speed-
meter It has been described as follows:
r People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 398,126 N.E.2d
377, 378 (1955). Defendant found not guilty because he
was not identified as driver of car by photos taken. Cf.
People v. Pett, 13 Misc.2d 975, 178 N.Y. S.2d 550
(Police J. Ct. 1958).
6 Carrier v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 633,634 (Ky.
1951).
7 Radar speedmeter is now used in forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia. There are about 700
speed detection sets in operation.
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[i]n rather simplified language, here is how the
radar speedometer--'the little black box' as it
has been called-works: behind the front panel
of the speedmeter are two antennas; one of
these sends out a cone-shaped stream of radar
waves at a certain frequency in the direction
the speedmeter is pointed. When a moving ve-
hicle runs through these waves, they bounce
back from it at a different frequency from
which they were sent out s and the change in
frequency varies directly with the speed of the
moving object off which they reflect. The sec-
ond antenna catches the reflected waves and
their frequency is compared with that of the
waves sent out. The difference in frequency is
simplified and translated into miles per hour
on a speedometer dial which is part of the
speedmeter.9 The speed of moving vehicles is
recorded on a graph hooked up to the speed-
meter. Usually the speedmeter is placed on the
fender or in the open trunk of a police car
called the 'radar car' which is parked alongside
the road; the closer it is to the road, the more
accurate it will be. Down the road in one or
8Doppler effect: "In sound, this effect is observed
every day; where a train is approaching or going away
from an observer, he will hear an apparent frequency
difference in its bell or whistle from the frequency he
would hear if both he and the train were at a standstill.
An automobile horn would give the same effect, if the
source of vibration is coming toward the observer, the
frequency will be higher; going away from him, the
frequency will be lower." Note, Radar Traffic Controls,
23 TENN. L. Rxv. 784, 785-786 (1955).
9 The basic formula for measurement as stated by Dr.
John M. Kopper in his article, The Scientific Reliability







where v = velocity of the moving vehicle in miles per
hour.
V = velocity of electromagnetic waves in space
in miles per hour = 186,281 miles per
second times 3600, the number of seconds
in an hour. This figure is constant.
FD = beat frequency, measured by the speed-
meter.
F = frequency of oscillation of the radio waves
from the meter, 2,455,000,000 cycles per
second. This is the frequency of the radio
waves transmitted from the speedmeter.
This frequency is hard to keep precisely
constant. Dr. Kopper states that this
frequency is maintained to within 0.1%
of 2,455,000,000 cycles per second, and
that this variation is the reason for the
margin of error of the speedmeter being two
miles per hour.
both directions from the radar car will be one
or two other police cars known as 'pickup cars'.
These cars and the radar car communicate
back and forth by radio. When a speed violator
passes the radar car, the radar operator or an-
other police officer in the radar car radios the
pickup car down the road, and this latter car
apprehends the speeder.'0
BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTS
Four general methods have been developed by
scientists to measure alcoholic concentration in the
blood. They are chemical analyses of the four
bodily substances: blood, urine, saliva, and
breath." Science has discovered that determination
of the blood alcohol concentration will show the
influence of alcohol on the person's driving ability.
This result is a consequence of medical research
which "has established that it is not the amount of
alcohol consumed by a person which affects driving
ability but the amount of alcohol absorbed into the
blood and thus circulated through the body which
affects the brain and other nerve centers and,
correspondingly, the mental and or physical
faculties." 12
Several tests 3 are commonly in use to analyze
the bodily fluids-blood, saliva, and urine-for
alcohol. All three bodily fluids can undergo the
identical chemical test with the only requirement
being that the urine and saliva tests be correlated
to the blood alcohol concentration. The chemical
tests employed have several common characteris-
tics: "all employ distillation for separation of the
ethyl alcohol from the specimen; the alcohol in the
distillate is quantitated in each by oxidation, using
potassium dichromate in sulfuric acid solution
below the critical concentration of 20 N, the oxida-
tion, in fact, being carried out at less than 18 N
acidity." Under these conditions, ethyl alcohol in
10 Note, Black Magic to Catch Speeders, 9 Wyo. L. J.
122 (1945).
n See Rabinowitch, Chemical Tests of Alcoholic In-
toxication, 29(2) OzRr DIcTA 15 (1955) for discussion
of extent to which these analyses reflect the percentage
of alcohol in blood. Note discussion on saliva, at 40-41,
and why rarely used as substance to be analyzed.
32 DONIGAN, supra n.4 at 59. See also Rabinowitch,
supra n.11 at 23-25, on correlation between brain and
blood alcohol.
13 The tests go by the name of the scientists who
developed them: Heise, Nicloux, Harger, Widmark,
Dubowski, Friedemann, and Brooke tests.
14 The normality, usually designated by a capital N,
ii the number of gram-equivaents of solute per liter of
solution. The label 18 N represents a solution which
contains eighteen gram-equivalents of potassium
dichromate per liter of solution.
[Vol. 59
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the distillate is quantitatively oxidized to acetic
acid and volatile impurities exert minimal inter-
ference." 10
To determine the amount of alcohol in breath,
six different types of portable laboratories are in
common use: the drunkometer, the drunkotester,
the alcometer, the alcotester, the intoximeter, and
the breathalyzer. "The breathalyzer is probably the
best of the breath methods18 for determining blood
alcohol in that the measuring device for determin-
ing the volume of air tested is very well engineered
and appears to be quite accurate",7 It is also the
simplest. The subject blows into the mouthpiece
of the device while in the "TAKE" position. 8 The
last portion of the breath coming from deep in the
lungs is collected in a cylinder. A stainless steel
piston then lowers itself to cover a definite volume
of breath. This sample is delivered for analysis by
placing the valve in the "ANALYZE" position.' 9
The piston then lowers, forcing the collected breath
"into an ampoule containing 3 ml. of 0.025% potas-
sium dichromate and 0.025% silver nitrate in 50%
by volume of sulfuric acid. In this solution, the
alcohol is quantitatively oxidized to acetic acid
with a corresponding reduction of dichromate....
This reduction is accompanied by a loss of yellow
color measured by two photoelectric cells originally
balanced at zero. At the same time a pointer moves
on the face of the breathalyzer giving the blood
alcohol concentration." 20
15 MANUAL, CHEmcA TESTS FOR INTOXICATION,
34-35 (1959):
"The differences between the methods are in (a)
the method of distillation, whether by direct distil-
lation of distillation of a deproteinized filtrate;
(b) the choice of protein precipitants; (c) the size,
type and construction of the distillation apparatus;
(d) the sulfuric acid concentration (ranging from
about 17 N to 2 N) and the potassium dichromate
concentration used during the oxidation, with
consequent differences in the range of alcohol con-
centration of the several methods; and (e) the
measurement of changes in the oxidizing reagent,
whether by visual colorimetry, spectrophotometry,
or titrimetry. The last represents the most im-
portant difference between these methods."
See id. at 34-41, for detailed description of apparatus,
reagents, and procedures employed in each test.
1" See Rabinowitch, supra n.11 at 42-51, for reasons
why breath tests, like saliva tests, should not be used.
' ERWIN, TnE DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES
28 (1963). For a detailed discussion of the breathalyzer,
see Coldwell and Grant, The Brealltalyzer and Factors
Affecting Its Accuracy, 8 J. For. Sci. 149-162 (1963).
"8See Taylor, Determzining the Competence of a
Breathialyzer Operator, 9 CAN. B. J. 299, 300-301 (1966).
9 Id.
"0 Id. at 301. For diagrams, operational procedures,
and chemicals used in all six methods, see MAwuAL,
supra n.15 at 45-53.
TE TESTING ENvimoNamNT
Basic problems arise in the practical application
of any scientific device or test. The principles of the
radar speedmeter or the breathalyzer may be
sound, and yet the practical on-the-spot operation
of these devices may fail to account for all relevant
factors. The legal effectiveness of these scientific
methods must depend on how carefully their
scientific principles are modified to accommodate
the real world.
The photo-traffic camera, for example, has been
shown to have very little value in a court of law.
The device fails to identify the driver of the auto-
mobile. The legal effectiveness of the instrument
was illustrated in a case where the speed determina-
tion was not disputed, but the defendant could not
be identified as the driver. The defendant's convic-
tion was reversed on appeal."
The increasing use of the radar speedmeter
raises similar questions as to practicality of opera-
tion, accuracy, and reliability. The scientific
principle seems to be generally accepted as sound,u
and yet "the problem is to measure the speed of a
vehicle moving with respect to a stationary ob-
server." 2 The operator must, therefore, note all
factors possibly affecting the radar speedmeter
reading at the time the measurement is being taken.
Such factors include not allowing the device a
ten minute warm-up period, or, allowing the
pointer of the meter to be above zero before meas-
urements are taken. The effect of both is additive
and should be noted. "Diathermy apparatus in the
vicinity can give false readings, which would be
noticed by sudden jumps to, say, seven miles per
hour at the switching on of the diathermy machine,
and sudden drops back to zero at switching off." 24
Even the movement of birds, trees, and signs can
effect the reading on the radar speedmeter. Their
effect is minimal, but "their frequency corresponds
to that of the moving target, it cannot be filtered
out without removing the desired target signal
also." 25 The age of the radar instrument would
cause it to read less than the actual speed. The
radar car's distance and angle from the road are
21 People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d
377 (1955).
2- See Carosell and Coombs, Radar Evidence in the
Courts, 32 DICTA 323 (1955) which says that the
principle as applied to speed measurement and con-
clusion that "unchallenged concept of its operational
effectiveness has been erroneous."
"Kopper, supra n.9 at 343.
24 Id. at 351.
" See Carosell and Coombs, supra n.22 at 331.
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also relevant factors in considering the accuracy of
the measurement.
26
The problem of singling out the speeding vehicle
is no less significant than the measurement of the
vehicle's speed. "Radar is at its best in dealing
with isolated targets in a relatively featureless
background." 27 The practical difficulty becomes
apparent in trying to track a speeding car on a
multi-lane freeway amid the background of
buildings, signs, and people. However, the radar
speedmeter will always record the vehicle with the
highest speed. The problem becomes one of instan-
taneous action by the operator. He must interpret
the radar results, read and assign license numbers,
accurately identify the offending car, and warn
the arresting officer in two secornds if the car is
going only forty miles per Jour.E The radar device is
obviously most effective in single lane traffic ap-
proaches where the observer's judgments are less
complicated. Naturally, where there is traffic in
both directions, further problems of the selection
of the offending car arise.
The list of imponderables is limitless. 29 The
operators are human. The device they work with
takes measurements in millionths of a second.
Between these two extremes lies the practical
utility of the radar speedmeter measurements. It
becomes highly important, therefore, that the
device be checked and that the operator be quali-
fied to handle the practical as well as the scientific
problems which will arise.
Certain problems, such as the difficulty of re-
membering details, can be eliminated. A recording
of all pertinent information at the time of metering
should be made by the officer. The speed, color,
kind of car, license number, and the time of day are
pertinent facts to write down. The scientific evi-
dence will have a more convincing legal foundation
if the details of the moment are transcribed in a
regularly kept log book.
Chemical tests for intoxication have their own
sphere of practical complications. Obviously,
when a person is apprehended, it is impossible to
immediately administer a blood alcohol analysis. 0
26d. at 327. No less than twenty three limiting
factors are cited as effecting the accuracy of the radar
speedmeter including, e.g., any noise which could be
picked up such as the slamming of a door.
2 7Id. at 333.
8Id. at 335.
29 Id.
10 DomGA, supra n.4 at 44:
"Examples of reasons for delay are unavailability
of the testing equipment or qualified personnel to
The chemical testing may take place hours after
the actual apprehension. The amount of the blood
alcohol concentration decreases with each minute
of delay. However, since the average rate of
metabolism of alcohol in the body of persons is
generally known, the amount of alcohol concen-
tration at the earlier time can be accurately
estimated." As a practical matter, though, the
relation of the test result as close to the time of the
event as possible is essential, especially if the case
may be tried to a jury.
"But it is not always wise. to rush things too
much." 2 A urine specimen taken too soon after the
time of apprehension may nullify the value of a
subsequent urinalysis. "The capacity to retain
urine for may hours, despite the tendency of
alcohol, at times, to induce urination" 3 may result
in including urine excreted long before the time of
apprehension. "A breath test will give an accurate
determination of blood alcohol concentration only
if there has been a time lapse of at least 15 minutes
between consuming the last drink of alcoholic
beverage and the taking of the specimen for analy-
A further practical consideration is that the
chemical tests are conducted on specimens from
individuals of varying mental and physical char-
acteristics. The conventional tests for impairment
are grossly insensitive for persons who "can hold
their liquor". Moreover, tests conducted have
shown that there is considerable individual varia-
tion in reaction and performance under a given
concentration of alcohol in the blood. "As an addi-
tive to this are the variations in degrees of skill
and nervousness of different individuals." 15 Never-
theless, scientists have set certain percentages as
indicative of the fact that one is "under the in-
fluence of" intoxicating liquor. Their findings have
been incorporated into the Uniform Vehicle Code,
and adopted by most states, as presumptive
evidence.38
take the specimen at the moment, the need some-
times to travel considerable distances before such
tests can be conducted, necessity for responsible
officers to investigate at the scene, or the hospital-
ization before officers are able to request that he
submit to a chemical test."
"1Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34
Ky. L. J. 250, 257-258 (1945).
2DONIGAN, supra n.4 at 68.
"Rabinowitch, supra n.11 at 36.
"DoMoAN, supra n.4 at 29.
"1 Newman and Fletcher, Effect of Alcohol on Driving
Skill, 115 A. M. A. J. 1600 (1940).
"1 §11-902, UNuozm VxmcLae CODE (1962):
"1. If there was at that time 0.05% or less by
[Vol. 59
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Even worse than finding as drunk those who
"can hold their liquor", are the suppositions of
these tests that a driver is drunk when in point of
fact he is seriously ill. "On regrettable occasions
diabetics and persons with apoplexy or brain
tumors have died in jail after wrongful arrest for
supposed drunkeness." s The number of clinical
symptoms in common with intoxication is well
over a hundred.
Chemical tests for intoxication have inherent
weaknesses, and require constant checking to
eliminate erroneously high readings. In the breath
tests for example, if the stomach contains a large
concentration of alcohol from a recent drink,
"burping, belching, or hiccoughing can give high
and usually erratic readings because these physical
phenomena are all ways in which a gas bubble is
expelled from the stomach." 19 The effects of the
Mellanby phenomenon40 reduce the reliability of
blood tests as indications of mental impairment.
Contamination in the subject's mouth creates the
possibility that the saliva test results will be
erroneous. Condensation in the breath apparatus
causes a loss of alcohol and a resultant erroneous
reading. It has been contended that blood is
undoubtedly the best choice for analysis, but un-
fortunately problems of convenience and "the
necessity of the services of a skilled technician for
the venapuncture" require that less reliable bodily
substances be analyzed. 4
The tests themselves must be conducted with
precision. The instruments must be kept clean
and sterile by antiseptics containing no alcohol.
The chemicals used must be fresh and pure. Proper
measurement of all chemicals and containers must
be taken at constant intervals.4' Care must be
weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shall be
presumed that the person was not under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor; 2. If there was at
that time in excess of 0.05% but less than 0.10%
by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, such
fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the
person was or was not under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor, but such facts may be considered
with competent evidence in determining whether
the person was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor; 3. If there was at that time 0.10% or more
by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shall
be presumed that the person was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor."
17 Maxwell, Drinking atid Driving, 9 CAN. B. J. 279,
282 (1966).
ns DoNiAN, supra n.4 at Appendix IV, 300-06.
39 Taylor, supra n.18 at 304.
40 See Rabinowitch, supra n.11 at 29-35 for a general
discussion of this phenomenon.
41 Newman, supra n.31 at 250.
" DNIGAN, supra n.4 at 66.
taken that alcohol is not used within the vicinity
of the testing area. The possibility of errors from
the latter factors requires daily blank run-throughs
by competent technicians.
Successful prosecution by use of the scientific
procedures described will depend ultimately on
their acceptance by courts of law. If the scientific
devices and their test results are ruled inadmissible,
their usefulness to law enforcement agencies is
nullified. Considerations must now be given to the
view courts have taken of scientific evidence in
traffic cases with particular emphasis placed on
the admissibility of the drunkenness tests and the
radar speedmeter.
PROBLEMS OF TEST ADMiSSIBILITY
Courts are primarily concerned with the ac-
curacy and reliability of the scientific evidence
being offered. Courts, therefore, require that a
foundation first be laid establishing the compe-
tency of the test. Witnesses, preferably experts, are
required, of the prosecution, to testify as to the
scientific principles involved, to interpret results,
and demonstrate accuracy in each particular in-
stance.
The process of testing for drunkenness involves
three stages, each requiring testimonial substantia-
tion. First, there is the taking of the specimen by
a doctor or technician, or, in the case of a breath
test, by a policeman trained in the operation of the
test instruments. Here, there is the initial
problem of showing that the specimen ana-
lyzed actually was that taken from the sub-
ject person. The greater the number of persons
who have handled a particular specimen, the
greater the chance of mix-up, and the more
difficult is the task of proving identification in
the courtroom.4'
The prosecution may be forced to produce a string
of witnesses to properly identify the specimen.44
Many cases show the courts disapproval of care-
less handling procedures. The chain of evidence
41 Id. at 75.
4State v. Tarcha, 3 Conn. Cir. 43, 45, 207 A.2d 72,
75 (1964). Five witnesses were brought forth to identify
a particular glass tube. The court held that a proper
identification was made. Other cases in which identifi-
cation of specimen held sufficient: State v. Webb, 76
Idaho 162, 279 P.2d 634 (1955); City of Columbus v
Marks, 118 Ohio App. 394, 194 N.E.2d 791 (1963);
Zoch v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 620, 273 S.W.2d 622
(1955).
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must be preserved throughout, or the courts will
hold the evidence inadmissible.
4
Futhermore, at this point in the chemical
testing, a qualified person is required to extract
the specimen. The taking of urine and breath
specimens for analysis are relatively simple tasks.
"For such duties as this, civilian or police personnel
can be properly trained." 46 Nevertheless, certain
procedures must be followed by these persons in
order to insure the admissibility of the test results
as evidence. They must be able to testify that all
containers were dean, and that the specimens
were not contaminated. The breathalyzer operator
must be trained to understand the effects of con-
densation and temperature changes before his
testimony will be rendered admissible.0 The extrac-
tion of blood specimens should always be left to
medical technicians.48
Finally, at this first stage, courts usually require
that the testing device be shown to have been
functioning properly.49 This requirement is satisfied
by proof that the apparatus, in the case of the
breath tests, is regularly checked by blank runs.
These checks should also establish that the chem-
icals used are compounded to the proper percent-
age.5
9
During the second stage, the courts generally
require that a chemical or laboratory technician
45 Brown v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 144, 240 S.W.2d 210
(1951). Conviction set aside where only two of the
many persons who had handled the specimen were
called as witnesses. Accord, Apodaca v. Baca, 73 N.M.
104, 385 P.2d 963 (1963); Benton v. Pellum, 232 S.C.
26, 100 S.E.2d 534 (1957)- Rodgers v. Commonwealth,
197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
'6 DOmGAN, supra n.4 at 88. See also City of Wichita
v. Showalter, 185 Kan. 181, 341 P.2d 1001 (1959) where
the results of chemical test by means of alcometer were
admissible even though police operator of instrument
was not able to testify to intricacies of device or condi-
tion of chemicals.
47 See generally Taylor, supra n.18.
48UauroaRm VE HcLE CODE §11-902(d), (1962)
recommends: "When a person shall submit to a blood
test ... only a physician or a registered nurse may
withdraw blood .... This limitation shall not apply to
the taking of breath or urine specimens."
49 State v. Miller, 64 N.J Super 262, 165 A.2d 829
(1960). See also State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355
P.2d 806 (1960) where it was held that for the result
of breathalyzer test to be admissible, prosecution must
produce prima facie evidence that (1) instrument was
properly checked and in working order at time of test,
and (2) chemicals employed were of correct kind and
compounded in proper proportions.
50 See Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 256 S.W.2d
93 (1953) where such was not established and convic-
tion was reversed. But see State v. Warren, 75 Ariz.
123, 252 P.2d 781 (1953) where testimony of chemist
that he checked chemicals periodically was sufficient
to establish reliability of drunkometer at all times.
must analyze the specimen extracted.a The person
who conducts this phase of the process should be
produced, and his qualifications must be proved.
Sometimes it is preferable to use as such a
witness the head of the laboratory in which
the particular test was conducted rather than
one of the laboratory technicians who actually
ran the test for the reason that the director
.. may be able to qualify as an expert...
to prove elements.., other than just the
details of analysis.52
To do this, however, the head of the laboratory
must have supervised the test in the particular
case.n
The operator of one of the common breath
devices need not be a scientist in order to conduct
an acceptable analysis. However, the courts require
adequate training and experience to qualify a
person to testify. 'Before any person is assigned
as an operator of one of these instruments, he
should be trained in the basic scientific principles
of its operation and the chemical technique in-
volved." A If the operator is not qualified to testify
as to these matters, this type of information
must be supplied by someone else. 9 The usual
courtroom procedure, then, is to have the oper-
ator testify as to facts he observed, and then have
a qualified expert follow him on the stand to
interpret what the operator observed.56 But if
the qualified expert did not supervise the oper-
ator, his testimony may constitute hearsay.n
The analysts who conduct tests on blood or urine
are usually specialists in this field. They are quali-
fied to testify since their work necessarily requires
5r UNffos VEmncan CoDE §11 -902(a), (1962) which
recommends that there be legislation in each state
requiring supervision at the state level of all chemical
test programs. A number of states have done so, e.g.,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
&2 DONIGA-T, supra n.4 at 91.
3 Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93
(1953).
5 DONIGAN, supra n.4 at 92. See Fortune v. State,
197 Tenn. 691, 277 S.W.2d 381 (1955). Testimony of
police officer who ran test on drunkometer but who
lacked knowledge of principles of operation and who
could not translate readings, showed he was not
qualified as an expert witness.
55 See Riddle v. State, 288 P.2d 761 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1955). Accord, Fortune v. State, 197 Tenn. 691,
277 S.W.2d 381 (1955).
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an understanding of the scientific principles and
chemical techniques involved."
In the third phase of testing, an expert inter-
prets the results obtained by the technicians. This
aspect has been alluded to in connection with the
breath test results taken by a policeman not
familiar with the theory of the test.5 Included in
this area is the necessity for a qualified expert to
tell the court what the blood-alcohol ratio means. 0
This opinion requires technical training in the
physiological effects of alcohol on the human body.
A chemist conducting a blood test may not be
qualified to discuss the blood-alcohol ratio."
Finally, in this third stage, courts require expert
testimony as to the reliability of the specific
method used. This witness must be thoroughly
familiar with the scientific principles of, and proper
techniques required in conducting, the test in
issue. However, judicial notice62 of the reliability
of the techniques used to analyze blood, urine,
and breath is now more commonly taken. In some
jurisdictions, legislative approval of the reliability
of the drunkometer has been given," and the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that judicial
notice of breath devices is now well recognized:
The drunkometer is sufficiently established
and accepted as a scientifically reliable and
accurate device for determining the alcoholic
content of the blood to admit testimony of the
reading obtained upon a properly conducted
test, without any need for antecedent expert
testimony by a scientist that such reading is a
trustworthy index of blood alcohol, or why."
The effect of judicial notice on the admissibility
of scientific evidence in traffic cases is vitally
important to law enforcement agencies. Judicial
58 See the following cases in point: State v. Weise,
75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97 (1954); Block v. State, 125
Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951); State v. Koenig, 240
Iowa 592, 36 N.W.2d 765 (1949); Gamez v. State,
171 Tex.Cr.R. 17, 353 S.W.2d 419 (1961).
59 See n.54.
60 Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93
(1953).
6 Lopez v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 225 S.W.2d
852 (1949).
62 "The true nature of what is judicially known is
that it is something which is already in the court's
possession or, at any rate, is so accessible that it is
unnecessary and therefore time wasting to require
evidence of it." State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 370,
216 A.2d 625, 628 (1966).
6 See McDonald v. Ferguson, N.D., 129 N.W.2d 348
(1964) holding North Dakota's legislation valid; also
Maryland, Ohio, Virginia.
UState v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 170, 199 A.2d 809,
822 (1964).
notice establishes general recognition of the
scientific evidence offered. The requirements of
proper testing, qualified operators, and periodic
checking are retained. However, the practical
result is that the scientific evidence becomes more
conclusive upon admission when expert testimony
is no longer required to prove its reliability. A
defendant can no longer rely on a court's doubt
concerning the reliability of the evidence being
offered against him, and must present substantial
countervailing evidence to rebut the presumption
of guilt thus produced. 5
At this point, consideration of the legal effect
of the radar speedmeter should be attempted
because it is here that judicial notice is most preva-
lent. Most courts have adopted the view that
"the usefulness of radar equipment for testing
the speed of vehicles has now become so well
established that testimony of an expert to prove
reliability of radar in this respect is not necessary
and courts will take judicial knowledge of such
fact." 11 Where judicial notice has not been taken,
the scientific theory upon which the use of the
radar speedmeter is based must be shown by
expert testimony. Once the scientific theory is
established by expert testimony, the practical
effect is usually the same as if the court had taken
judicial notice of the theory.
615 Compare People v. Johnson, 8 Misc.2d 408, 165
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1957), where in the absence of expert
testimony as to accuracy of radar speed recording
device, evidence merely disclosing the reading of such
device was insufficient to sustain conviction for viola-
tion of speeding ordinances, with People v. Magri, 3
N.O.2d 562, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958) where court no
longer considered it necessary to require expert testi-
mony as to the nature of the scientific principles in-
volved, and upheld conviction by simply combining the
radar readings with the independent observations of
speed by the police officers. The type of countervailing
evidence the defendant may present is limited. One
possible defense is that cars going in the opposite or the
same way affected the results of the recording device.
Another possible defense is the short length of time the
vehicle is under radar observation. Neither defense is
accorded too much weight in jurisdictions which take
judicial notice of the principles of radar detection.
66 Everight v. Little Rock, 230 Ark. 695, 697, 326
S.W.2d 796, 797 (1959). Accord, State v. Tomahelli, 153
Conn. 365, 369, 216 A.2d 625, 627 (1966), "... the
scientific accuracy of the Doppler-shift principle for
measurement of speed, if the principle is correctly
applied, is, in the discretion of the court, a proper
subject of judicial notice....", See generally E.S. v.
Dreos, D.C., 156 F.Supp 200 (1957); State v. Graham,
322 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. App. 1959); People v. Johnson,
23 Misc.2d 11, 196 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1960). But see 11
Am. JuR. PRoor or FACTS, SPEED, Supp. 18-34 (1966)
where the type of testimony required to explain the
theory of operation and general scientific accuracy of
the radar speedmeter is outlined.
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"Judicial notice does not extend to accuracy or
efficiency of any given police radar instrument....
whether the instrument itself is accurate and is ac-
curately operated, must necessarily be demon-
strated to the satisfaction of the trier [of fact].
"67
The courts have developed several require-
ments as to what has to be shown by the prose-
cution prior to admission of even judicially rec-
ognized evidence. Generally, the courts require
answers to two questions: (1) How accurate was
the machine functioning at the time the accused's
speed was checked, and (2) was the radar speed-
meter properly operated?68
The answer to the first question will depend on
how often, and under what circumstances, the
radar equipment was checked. A "before and
after" test has been accepted by several courts. 69
This test is accomplished by one officer driving
his car through the beam of the radar speedmeter
operated by another officer, and by radio com-
munication they compare the radar dial reading
with the speedometer reading of the car. "If the
readings coincide, the officers consider the radar
meter as functioning properly and proceed to
apprehend speeding motorists. The same check is
normally made after the completion of its use for
the day." 70 The requirements for checking are
made considerably harder in some courts, which
demand that the tuning forks themselves be
ckecked periodically2' To insure the validity of the
test, most judges rule that the speedometer
against which the radar speedmeter is checked
must itself be tested from time to time. 2 Each
change in location has been held by some courts to
necessitate another equipment checkY3 These
latter requirements are summed up in one opinion
that indicates that the value of any test of a radar
speedmeter depends upon the accuracy of the
measuring device against which it is checked 4
67 State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 372, 216 A.2d
625, 629 (1966).
6
8 See Note, Radar Traffic Controls, 23 TENN. L. .Fv.
784 (1955); See also Hardaway v. State, 202 Tenn. 94,
302 S.W.2d 351 (1957) where judicial notice taken if
radar speedmeter is tested for accuracy from time to
time, and when properly operated.
69 Cromer v. State, 374 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964).
70 See Note, supra n.68 at 793.
71 St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. App.
1963).
72 People v. Johnson, 23 Misc.2d 11, 196 N.Y.S.2d
227 (1960).7
1 St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. App.
1963).
74 State v. Graham, 322 S.W.2d 188, 197 (Mo. App.
1959).
Finally, the qualifications of the tester must be
established. This requirement has become less
demanding, however, as the use of the radar speed-
meter becomes more widespreadY5
A strict requirement has been announced in one
case to the effect that certain court recommen-
dations76 would have to be followed to fully protect
the rights of the defendant.7 If these recommenda-
tions were not followed, the state's case would not
be strong enough to require a conviction. The
considerations here were set forth to control the
weight to be accorded such evidence78 as well as
to its admissibility.
Admissibility of the radar speedmeter evidence,
in some jurisdictions, is not absolutely contingent
on the testing requirement. "A reading from an
untested speedometer or radar device is admissible,
but is not, without more, sufficient for a speeding
conviction." 79 The additional evidence can come
from a witness "with specific experience and fami-
liarity with motor vehicles and their speed." so
A final requirement in some courts relates to
both the chemical tests and the speed measuring
devices. 8' "All evidence which is not founded upon
76 See People v. Johnson, 23 Misc.2d 11, 196 N.Y.S.2d
227 (1960) where a state trooper who attended two
radar schools and worked with radar for more than a
year was qualified to state an opinion as to operation of
radar equipment; cf. Dr. Kopper's statement in People
v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1954): "an
operator unskilled in electronics can quite easily deter-
mine when the machine is not functioning properly."
See also Dietze v. State, 162 Nebr. 80, 75 N.W.2d 95
(1956) where experience of the operator with the device
was sufficient to establish the accuracy of the machine.76 See St. Louis v. Boecker, 370 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Mo.
App. 1963).
(1) Allow the set to warm up, (2) check to see that
the dial reads zero, (3) since diathermy machines,
swinging signs, swaying trees, and other outside
sources can give false readings, examine the meter
for such indications, (4) check accuracy by run-
through test, both before and after the period of
observation, by having a car with a calibrated
speedometer run through the zone twice at two
different speeds, and (5) that if the difference be-
tween the speedometer reading and the radar meter
is greater than two miles per hour, that a further
check be made.
17 People v. Sachs, 1 Misc.2d 148, 165, 147 N.Y.S.2d
801, 809 (New York City Magis. Ct. 1955).7' See discussion in text at n.170-177, infra.
71 People v. Fletcher, 216 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
Accord People v. Johnson, 23 Misc.2d 11, 196 N.Y.S.2d
227 (1960).
81 People v. Tanner, 6 Misc.2d 1007, 1010, 165
N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1957).
8 Note that the discussion has centered on the radar
speedmeter device. The same requirements are appli-
cable to the speed-watch device (Prather Speed Device)
and the photo-patrol instrument. See in relation to
speed-watch: People v. Kenney, 354 Mich. 191, 92
N.W.2d 335 (1958); People v. Asheroff, 12 Misc.2d 10,
174 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1958); People v. Jamison, 8 Misc.2d
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the personal knowledge of the witness from whom
it is elicited and which consequently does not
depend for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court or jury may have in
him" 82 is hearsay. "Evidence of this kind is not
admissible when offered to prove the truth of the
matter therein asserted." 8
Several situations have been alluded to which
would fall under the ambit of the hearsay rule,"
but for the growing area of exceptions. Some of
these exceptions are founded on the principle
that evidence, though technically hearsay because
not within the personal knowledge of the witness
who testifies, is reliable because certain circum-
stances assure trustworthiness. Another ground
for an exception to the hearsay rule is necessity.
In some cases hearsay may be the only evidence
available and justice would fail if it were to be
rejected 5
A notable situation regarding the hearsay rule
arose in connection with an attempt to establish
the accuracy of the radar speedmeter. In People
v. Offerman, the court ruled that the testimony
of each of the officers as to the test results would
be hearsay because
... it seems clear that when Officer Kelly
testified that the reading on the dial in the
radar car corresponded to the reading of the
speedometer in the pickup car, he was relying
upon what Officer Chaplain had told him over
the radio, and when Officer Chaplain testified
that the reading on the dial in the radar car
corresponded with the reading on the speed-
ometer of the pickup car, he was relying on
what Officer Kelly told him over the radio.
Thus, the testimony of each as to the reading
on the instrument of the car of the other was
hearsay.6
In State v. Dantonio, the same question was
raised, but the court reached a different con-
clusion.
408, 165 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1957), and in relation to the
photo-patrol device: People v. Pett, 13 Misc.2d 975,
977, 178 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (1958) which required
"expert testimony as to the scientific principles under-
lying the device, along with other evidence that expert
inspected the device the evening of use, and further
tests conducted after the defendant was photographed."
82 DONiGAN AND FISHER, TFn EVIDENCE HANDBooK
27 (1965).
8 Id.
81 Such as those in text at n.9-10, n.43-44, and n.52-
53, supra.
81 See 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1421, 1422 (3d ed.
1940).
86 204 Misc. 769, 774, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1953).
Each officer testifies as to independent facts.
The patrol car officer testifies as a fact to the
speed of the patrol as shown by his speed-
ometer. The radar operator testifies as to the
recording of the electric speedmeter and the
graph machine and of his own visual obser-
vation of the car making the test. Radio com-
munication is merely incidental. The fact of
the speed of the patrol car and the recording
of the electric speedmeter, the graph machine,
the observation of the radar operator remain
the same without the benefit of radio communi-
cation.Y
The view in the Offerman case is questionable.
One commentator noted that "if both officers
are in court and subject to cross examination, it is
hard to see how the testimony is objectionable." 's
The hearsay rule seems to be overly technical
in this situation, and should be discarded.
The hearsay problem can be seen very clearly
in one aspect of the introduction of chemical
test results "where proponents of the chemical
test evidence have attempted to prove essential
elements of their cases solely by means of written
reports, chemists' certificates of their records,
hospital records, and others." 89 The facts at-
tempted to be shown included identification of
the person as the one whose specimen was analyzed,
and the results of the analysis. Courts have fre-
quently held such evidence to be inadmissible
hearsay unless used solely to refresh the witness'
recollection. 0 If the witness on the stand has no
direct knowledge, except for the hospital records,
that the specimen is that of the defendant, "his
testimony respecting the result of the test is pure
hearsay so far as the defendants were concerned." 11
However, not all courts have held chemical
test reports inadmissible as hearsay evidence,
particularly when the identity of the person from
whom the specimen was extracted is not in doubt.
One case allowed the report of the state depart-
ment of health to be admissible to show the result
of the analysis without the testimony of the chem-
ist who performed it. The court held that such a
8 31 NJ.Super. 105, 109, 105 A.2d 918, 921 (1954).
'$ See Note, Radar Traffic Controls, 23 TnNN. L. Rnv.
784, 794 (1954). See also Woodbridge, Radar in the
Courts, 40 VA. L. REv. 809, 815 (1954).
9 DONiGAN, supra n.4 at 82.
90 See DONIGAN AND FisaER, supra n.82 at 114-115.
91 Natwick v. Moyer, 177 Or. 486, 493, 163 P.2d
936, 939 (1945). To same effect of inadequate identifica-
tion of person from whom specimen taken see: Bauer
v. Veith, 374 Mich. 1, 130 N.W.2d 897 (1964); McGowan
v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386. 223 P.2d 862
(1950).
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report was part of the official records of a public
officer and therefore was an exception to the
hearsay rule.
92
In some jurisdictions, courts have approved the
admissibility of hospital reports, chemists' certif-
icates, or police reports as entries made in the
regular course of business. 93 "The evidence must
consist of the original entries, made at a time
reasonably contemporaneous with the act, event,
or transaction thereby recorded, and it is this
element which furnishes the necessary guarantee
of the reliability." 14 Many states now have adopted
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,
which makes any kind of record admissible "if
shown to have been made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the transaction.
" 95
Another area involving hearsay is testimony of
a laboratory director or supervisor as to facts out-
side his first hand knowledge. If the director was
not present when the analysis was conducted and
must depend upon what is told him as to the re-
sults of that analysis, his testimony is hearsay and
inadmissible.96 But "if a chemist.., is present and
observes the.., test, or if it is made under his
supervision, he may testify as to the result of
the test." 9
The two general exceptions noted above' find
valuable applicability in this area of hearsay. The
12 Smith v. Mott, 100 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1957). But see
State v. Reenstierna, 101 N.H. 286, 140 A.2d 572
(1958) holding that a letter from the state department
of health relating to a blood analysis was not such an
official report as to constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule. See generally DoNiGAN AND FISHER,
supra n.82 at 82-85 for discussion of public records
exception.
93Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1962);
Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 112
Ga.App. 212, 144 S.E.2d 532 (1965) where official
report of state crime laboratory admissible. Contra,
Bauer v. Veith, 374 Mich. 1, 130 N.W.2d 897 (1964)
where hospital record not admissible because hospital
not required to keep record of blood analysis in cases
where subject is not a patient.
94 Do-mGA AND FIsHER, supra n.82 at 86.
95Id.
96 State v. Gagnon, 151 Me. 501, 503, 121 A.2d 345,
346 (1956).
9Leonard v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 470, 278 S.W.2d
313 (1955). See also State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704,
339 P.2d 45 (1959) where testimony of chemist as to
method and reliability of blood analysis made by an-
other was admissible; Mozley v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R.
244, 289 S.W. 939 (1956) where the biochemist who
supervised test was allowed to testify; Bryan v. State,
157 Tex.Cr.R. 592, 252 S.W.2d 184 (1952) where
result of blood analysis could be testified to by chemist
who was present and supervised analysis made by an-
other person.
91 See text at n.84-85, supra.
trustworthiness exception can be founded on the
fact that the law enforcement agents are testifying
to the readings on the radar or chemical test
devices. These have been judicially proven in
court to be reliable. The hearsay policy is to
keep out of court unreliable declarations offered
to prove the truth of their content. Moreover,
necessity requires the admission of certain evidence
which would otherwise be unobtainable. 99
The hearsay discussion concludes the section
devoted to the court's requirements for admis-
sibility of scientific evidence. The prosecution
can fulfill these requirements quite easily by
following a set procedure in any case employing
scientific test methods' 09 However, the prosecution
may also have to contend with a defendant's
objections against admissibility on grounds in-
volving a denial of constitutional rights.
Constitutional Implications of Intoxication Tests
The previous discussion of chemical tests for
intoxication has assumed a defendant who willingly
submitted to being tested. A variety of problems
have arisen where such is not the case. The leading
case on compulsory infringement of physical
integrity is Rochin v. California.0' In Rochin,
police officers, engaged in an illegal search, ob-
served the defendant swallow two capsules be-
lieved to contain narcotics. Over Rochin's ob-
jections, a doctor forced him to regurgitate the
capsules by inducing an emetic into his stomach
through a tube. The capsules were subsequently
used in evidence against him. The Supreme Court
found this conduct repugnant to notions of due
process, holding:
We are compelled to conclude that the
proceedings by which this conviction was
obtained do more than offend.... This is con-
duct that shocks the conscience... bound
to offend even hardened sensibilities.'9 '
The applicability of this due process test of
admissibility can be seen quite readily in a forcible
99 Note in this respect City of Seattle v. Bryan, 53
Wash.2d 321, 313 P.2d 680 (1958) where facts outside
of the police officer's own knowledge were testified to
and admitted over the objection of the defendant that
such evidence was hearsay.
100 See MANuAL, supra n.15 at Bo=NsTFrN, SuC-
GESTIONS FOR ORGANIZING A PROGRAM OF CHEMICAL
TESTS FOR INTOXIcATION; and Dr. Kopper's suggestions
in Kopper, supra n.9 at 343, for procedures to be fol-
lowed in radar testing.
101342 U.S. 165 (1952).
1
02 Id. at 172.
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extraction of a blood specimen and less readily
in the compulsion of a urine or breath specimen.
However, fortunately for the future of chemical
testing, the later Breithaupt decision'13 of the
Supreme Court held that here is nothing inherently
"brutal" or "offensive" in the taking of a blood
specimen from an unconscious motorist. This
decision therefore limits the due process holding of
Rochin T0 to dearly excessive force:
the absence of consent, without more, does not
render the taking a violation of a constitu-
tional right; and certainly the test as adminis-
tered here would not be considered offensive
by even the most delicate."0 5
Earlier state court decisions had foreshadowed
the view later adopted by the Court in Breithaupf.
In an Arizona case' 0  the defendant had been
forced to submit to a drunkometer test, and the
Rochin rule was held inapplicable. Later, a Cali-
fornia case allowed chemical tests to be admitted
over the objections of a defendant who claimed
that her blood had been forcibly takenj'7
The most important Supreme Court ruling on
the subject of compulsory blood tests has come in
Schmerber v. California.0 Schmerber accepted the
Breithaupt decision, but noted it left unanswered
the question of when a forcible extraction is
so dearly excessive as to fall under the Rochin
doctrine. However, the Court concluded that, in
103 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
10 Note that the Rochin decision has been narrowly
construed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
by the Fifth Circuit in Lane v. United States, 321
F.2d 573 (5th Cir., 1963), which said that general
concepts of due process are not violated by forcible
invasion of the body in particular, but by illegal police
conduct in general.
105Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-436
(1957). Note that Chief Justice Warren, writing in
dissent, found Rochii and Breithaupt indistinguishable.
i01 State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
Note that the facts of this case seem quite conclusive
on the defendant's side. The defendant protested
against being given a breath test. Nevertheless, the
officers had him strapped to a chair and one held the
defendant's head steady while the other captured his
exhaled breath in a container held up in front of his
mouth.
107 People v. Haeusaler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 931 (1953). See also
People v. Huber, 232 Cal.App.2d 663, 43 Cal.Rptr.
65 (1965).
1 384 U.S. 751 (1966): Officer took blood specimen
from injured defendant who was in hospital, but under
arrest for driving while under influence of intoxicants.
Result of subsequent chemical test of blood was held
admissible despite fact lawyer had advised defendant
not to submit to test and therefore he had protested the
extraction of blood from his body.
this instance, the manner of extraction was
reasonable:
It would be a different case if the police initi-
ated the violence, refused to respect a reason-
able request to undergo a different form of
testing, or responded to resistance with inap-
propriate force.' 0'
If literally interpreted, Schmerber suggests that
force may be legitimately used if not excessive
when compared with that employed by the de-
fendant. Furthermore, the decision seems to
adopt the view that societal interests in preventing
drunk driving outweigh individual interests in
physical integrity.
Due process arguments in this field may have
been dealt a blow by Schmerber, but several
other constitutional contentions were also con-
sidered. The defendant in Schmerber contended
that since the blood test taken involved a measure
of compulsion, his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated." 0 This argument is not unique in chemical
test cases. The Schmerber Court, in rejecting the
accused's contention, employed the historical
limitation"' on the scope of the self-incrimination
privilege when it held that "the privilege against
self-incrimination protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the state with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature .... " 12
The privilege, then, does not extend inviolability
to the body.
Most other courts have held, consistent with
the Supreme Court's historical view of theprivilege,
that blood, urine, or breath tests taken without
the consent of, or against the will of a person, are
nevertheless admissible, since this type of evidence
is considered physical rather than testimonial.
Cases arising in respect to unconscious or semi-
conscious persons are directly in point. Consent
I'D Id. at 760.
"' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) held that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I See Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can an
Accused Person Be Compelled To Do?, 28 J. C--n. L.C. &
P.S. 267 (1937) where an historical review is under-
taken. See also Ladd, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the
Blooi Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. Rnv.
191, 226 (1939).
'- 384 U.S. 751, 761 (1966). Note that the dissenters
saw the "self" as a totality, mind and body are within
the scope of the protection of the privilege as they
defined it.
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here is obviously lacking yet the courts have
consistently held that specimens extracted are
admissible because they are not testimony.23
The prohibition of compelling a man in a crim-
inal court to be a witness against himself is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material.6 4
Contrary to long established judicial precedent
on the subject, however, some few courts have
expanded the scope of the self-incrimination
privilege to include physical invasions of the body
for the purpose of chemical testing. These courts
require that a motorist must "expressly and volun-
tarily consent to such tests before any evidence
thereof shall be admissible in a subsequent criminal
prosecution against him." "1 The rule was first
applied in a Texas case,2 6 and now has been
accepted in Oklahoman1 and Maine.16
Even in these jurisdictions though, the privilege
may be waived. The courts will find waiver when
there is a voluntary consent to take the tests.2 19
Defense counsel, however, may still try to raise
the privilege in cases where it seems the "consent"
was given while the defendant was "under the
influence of" alcohol. This contention is predicated
on the assumption that if the defendant was "unfit
to operate a motor vehicle, then he was too much
" From an unconscious person: Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); People v. Haeusaler, 41
Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953); State v. Ayers, 70
Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); State v. Cram, 176 Ore.
577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945); People v. Peck, 199 Cal.
App.2d 857, 19 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1962). From a semi-
conscious person: Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240
P.2d 512 (1951); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99,
70 A.2d 909 (1950); People v. Tucker, 88 Cal.App.2d
333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948).
" Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
"1 DONIGAN, supra n.4 at 159.
n1 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 593, 146 S.W.2d
381 (1940). Accord, Trammel v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R.
543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956).
"* Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. Crim. App.
1964). Accord, Lorenz v. State, 406 P.2d 278 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965).
118 State v. Merrow, 161 Me. 111, 208 A.2d 659
(1965).
119 State v. Morkind, Iowa, 286 N.W. 412 (1939);
See State v. Johnson, 252 Iowa 1052, 135 N.W.2d 518
(1965) where informing the defendant of possible
revocation of license in case of refusal to submit to
test did not constitute coercion in obtaining test. See
also recent decisions in accord, City of Toledo v.
Dietz, 3 Ohio St.2d 30, 209 N.E.2d 127 (1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 956 (1965); People v. Sykes, 238
Cal.App.2d 156, 47 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1965).
under the influence of alcohol to be mentally
capable of waiving any constitutional rights and
therefore the alleged consent was invalid.... " 120
However, courts have distinguished between what
makes a motorist unfit to drive, and that impair-
ment of the mind which renders him incapable
of validly consenting to chemical testing. A higher
degree of intoxication is required for the latter. 2
An interesting new constitutional objection
has been raised with respect to the warning re-
quirement. Courts generally have held"'1 that a
motorist need not be warned of any right to refuse
to submit to a chemical test.12 The privilege could
therefore be impliedly waived by a failure to
objectlu or by submitting to the test after being
informed that favorable test results would result
in no chargeY.
2 5
In Miranda v. Arizona,"12 the Supreme Court
ruled that the government must respect the in-
violability of the person, m and procure evidence
against an accused by independent efforts. 12 Is
the implied waiver doctrine consistent with the
Miranda ruling? The efforts by the Court in
Miranda and Schmerber are directed at quite
different evils. In Miranda, the Court was in-
terested in remedying one evil-the inherently
coercive atmosphere of incommunicado police
interrogation. The Schimerber case did not present
this evil. "When the blood test is administered,
there is neither an overriding compulsion to speak
nor any trickery aimed at eliciting information." 129
The warning requirment, and the right to counsel
privilege as they relate to self-incrimination should
vary with the context of each case. The application
of these rights in the chemical testing field would
2 DONIGA, supra n.4 at 163.
2 Halloway v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 353, 175 S.W.2d
258 (1943) where a blood alcohol concentration of
0.275% was not sufficient to render the defendant
incapable of "knowing what he was doing." Accord,
Maudlin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 212 A.2d 502 (1965).
122 People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E.2d 211
(1954); State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435
(1937); City of Columbus v. Glenn, 102 N.E.2d 279
(Ohio App. 1950); People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d
122, 46 Cal.Rptr. 598 (1965).
m Especially in the absence of a statute requiring
otherwise.
"2 State v. Koenig, 240 Iowa 592, 36 N.W.2d 765
(1949); State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P.2d 435
(1937).
12' Hinkefent v. State, 267 P.2d 617 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1954) where defendant submitted to the test only
when officers told him no charges would be filed if he
was found not to be intoxicated by the test.
126 Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'Id. at 460.
123 Id.
29 See Note, 44 TExAs L. REv. 1619 (1966).
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surely destroy the test's effectiveness since time
is of the essence. For these reasons, Schmerber
and a number of cases preceding it have found no
denial of constitutional rights in the absence of a
warning or the denial of permission to contact a
lawyer 0 An interesting aspect of a holding that
compulsory testing does not constitute a violation
of the self-incrimination privilege is that the prose-
cution will, as a general rule, be permitted to
introduce evidence of an accused's refusal to sub-
mit to the taking of a specimen of blood, urine, or
breath. This rule is founded on the "premise that
a refusal to submit ... is a circumstance indicating
consciousness of guilt .... )" 131
Although the blood test in Schrnerber did not
violate the Fifth Amendment, due process, or
right to counsel privilege, the Court was also
faced with the contention that the text constituted
an "unreasonable search and seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment."" The Supreme Court recog-
nized that the extraction of blood is a search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court, therefore, considered the per-
missible scope of extraction and placed two re-
quirements on administering a blood test. First,
probable cause must exist, which means there must
be a "dear indication" that the desired evidence, a
high blood alcohol content, will be found.n
Furthermore, the Court held it necessary that
the test be administered by medical personnel
in a medical environment.ln This latter require-
ment suggests that a test administered by the
police in a police station would be considered
unreasonable." 5
With respect to the "clear indication" test and
110 See the following cases in point: State v. Randolph,
241 Ore. 479, 406 P.2d 791 (1965); State v. Lee, 246
S.C. 311, 143 S.E.2d 604 (1965); Parker v. State, 397
S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); State v. Plourde,
3 Conn.Cir. 465, 217 A.2d 423 (1965); Phelps v.
State, 404 P.2d 687 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965). Contra,
City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733, 409 P.2d
867 (1966) where denial of defendant's requests to call
his lawyer were regarded as sufficient basis to entitle
him to be discharged.
131 DONiGAN, supra n.4 at 166. See State v. Gatton,
60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); Lanford v.
People, 159 Colo. - 409 P.2d 829 (1966); Gardner
v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954);
State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275; Phelps
v. State, 404 P.2d 687 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965).
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) made that
provision of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Note that
this privilege may be waived by voluntary consent:
DomGAN, supra n.4 at 115.
N 384 U.S. 751, 770 (1966).
1 Id. at 771-772.
us5 Id.
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, attention should be given to the
effect of delay. The emergency of the situation
calls for a test to be taken while the alcohol is still
in the blood. Delay would threaten "destruction
of the evidence." In the case of an unconscious
person, the only way to determine the fact of intoxi-
cation is by a chemical test, and certainly this
should not be considered unreasonable. Further-
more, public interest is best served by discouraging
drunk driving and
so long as the measures adopted do not amount
to a substantial invasion of individual rights,
society must not be prevented from seeking to
combat this hazard to the safety of the public.
The extraction of blood for testing purposes
is an experience which, every day, many un-
dergo without hardship or ill effects. When
this fact, together with the scientific reliabil-
ity of blood alcohol tests in establishing guilt
or innocence, is considered in light of the im-
perative public interest involved, the taking
of a sample for such a test without consent
cannot be regarded as an unreasonable search
and seizure .... "I
The significant number of defendants who refuse
to submit to the chemical tests must be recog-
nized." Because of this some states have enacted
implied consent lawsm which require that any
person who operates a motor vehicle shall be
deemed to have consented to the administration
of a chemical test. Refusal to submit is a ground for
revocation of driving privileges. 13 9 The constitu-
116 People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 771, 312
P.2d 690, 693 (1957). See also People v. Lane, 240
Cal.App.2d 634, 49 Cal.Rptr. 712 (1966); Smith v.
State, 311 P.2d 275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), intoxim-
eter test given; Fletcher v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 321,
298 S.W.2d 581 (1957), blood test given. Contra, Lee v.
United States, 98 U.S.App. D.C. 97, 232 F.2d 354
(1956).
17See DONIGA, supra n.4 at 175-176: statistics
indicating that an enormous percentage of defendants
refuse to submit to the chemical testing.1 s New York was the first to enact such a statute
(1953). Since then Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, and most recently Rhode Island (1966). Some
state provisions, however, place restrictions on the law
enforcement agencies which give chemical tests. Such
conditions in some implied consent statutes hamper the
effectiveness of their supposed grant. See State v. Ball,
123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962) where the court ex-
pressed concern over the shortcomings of their state
statute.
1M9 See Mamet, Constitutionality of Compulsory
Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication, 36
19681
ROBERT GREENWALD
tionality of these statutes has been uniformly up-
held.140 States which have such statutes in effect
will be able to set to rest the issues of self-incrimina-
tion, search and seizure, and due process. It may
be, however, that by impliedly granting a right to
refuse to take the test, these statutes would pre-
clude forcible extraction. Schmerber gave clearance
to compelled intrusions if justified by the circum-
stances, or if not made in an improper manner.14'
The net result paradoxically may be that Schmerber
will induce some states to repeal their implied con-
sent laws.' 0
Radar Tests and the Doctrine of Entrapment
Entrapment, in special circumstances, may
preclude the admissibility of the results of radar
speedmeter or other speed tests. As Professor
Woodbridge has said, "Neither animal nor human
likes to be trapped." 143 Entrapment has been
defined as the "planning of a crime by the State's
employees, and the procurement by improper
inducement of its commission by one who would
not have done it but for such trickery." 144 Some
states, to eliminate possible antagonism toward
the use of speed measuring devices, and less
importantly to avoid the issue of entrapment,
have enacted statutes making "speed traps"
illegal145 and governing the use of radar for traffic
J. Crma. L.C. & P.S. 132 (1945), where the legal theory
behind this type of legislation is said to be that the use
of the highways is a privilege and that reasonable
conditions may be enacted to attach to that granted
privilege. See also Weinstein, Statute Compelling Sub-
mission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 46 J. Cur.
L. C. & P.S. 541 (1955), where the legal theory is
stated as being the state's use of its inherent police
power to limit privileges or just to promote the public
safety.
140 Idaho: State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d
1065 (1958); Kansas: State Hwy. Com'n. Motor
Vehicle Dept., 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961);
Nebraska: Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172
Nebr. 415, 110 N.W.2d 175 (1961); Virginia: Walton v.
City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315 (1963).
1- 384 U.S. 751, 768 (1966).
1
42 See discussion DomGAn, supra n.4 at 185-187, on
effect of these statutes on admissibility of chemical
test evidence.
"4 Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 VA. L.
REv. 809, 810 (1954).
144 1 ALEXANDER, LAW OF ARREST §316 at 1045
(1949).
145 E.g., California, Oregon, and Washington. See
Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 238 P. 88
(1925) where the constitutionality of the statute
upheld on the ground that the legislature may well
have thought that actively patrolling the roads was
the best method of preventing illegal speeding, and that
prevention of crime is far better than apprehension
after a preventable crime has taken place.
control. 46 The role of radar in states with speed
trap laws has not been adequately determined."'
However, warning signs, uniformed police, and
marked cars have all been held to rebut the claim
of a "trap."
The theory that police must always say in
effect, "We are about to check your speed,"
has been accepted by most law enforcement
agencies' 0 even where not required by statute.
But in some jurisdictions the law specifies that
signs must be posted. In Ohio, for example, the
statute specifically states that a sign reading
SPEED METER Arman must be erected not less
than 750 feet and not more than 1500 feet along
the road from where vehicles will be checked.
In Pennsylvania, "official warning signs" must be
present before evidence of speeding by use of
radar will be admitted' 4
In jurisdictions where the legislature has thus
acted, the motorist may well have a valid ob-
jection to the introduction of speed test results
if the commands of the statutes have not been
followed. However, in the absence of such statutes
it is clear that the courts have not accepted the
defense of entrapment. 50 One reason, as noted
above, is that in most places where the speed
measuring instruments are in use, signs warning
the motorist of their presence are erected. In
addition, the courts may be recognizing the use-
fulness of speed traps to eliminate crime on the
highways. By creating a high probability of
apprehension, the motorist may become more
considerate of others where he would otherwise
not be.
146 E.g., Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
117Se In Re Beamer, 133 Cal.App.2d 63, 283 P.2d
356 (1955) where speed trap law was held not to be
violated by the use of evidence secured by a radar
speedmeter. Note also that according to a statement in
43 CAAir. L. REv. 710, 713 (1955), an unpublished case
in Oregon held that the use of the radar speedmeter did
not violate the speed trap law (Salem v. Franz, June
22, 1954). Accord, State v. Ryan, 48 Wash.2d 304, 293
P.2d 399 (1956).
143 A survey taken shows that 86% of the respondents
used permanent type warning signs.
1
4
1 See Commonwealth v. Fornwalt, 203 Pa.Super.
411, 202 A.2d 115 (1964) where the statute was held
not to require use of exact language "radar is in opera-
tion" and does not require erection of specific sign at
time and place where police are using radar to appre-
hand speeders, signs with words "radar enforced"
were held sufficient. But see Commonwealth v. Brose,
412 Pa. 276, 194 A.2d 322 (1963) where conviction
reversed by state's failure to prove existence of any
signs on road.
110 Note that the defense of entrapment is not a
constitutional requirement.
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Another possible defense entails arguing the
necessity of legislation to authorize the use of
radar. A defendant may attempt to show the
court that until radar devices are given legislative
approval, they constitute hearsay because the
radar is in effect an out of court declaration.iE
Some states, to avoid this question, have passed
statutes authorizing the use of the radar speed-
meter,ln and providing that the result shall
constitute pria facie evidence of speeding,
"upon proof that the machine used for measuring
speed had been properly set up and recently tested
for accuracy." 10 However, the radar device has
been judicially proven to be a reliable outside
source and, thus, fits into the trustworthiness
exception previously discussedM
One difficulty in practical application of the
radar devices is the picking out of the speeding
car from heavy traffic. The defendant may claim
the officer picked out the wrong car, thus in-
validating the radar evidence in his case. "The
most effective rebuttal to this argument is the
testimony of a well-trained, intelligent, capable
enforcement officer, and one of unquestioned
integrity." 1 Moreover, courts allow
great latitude in establishing the identity of
one accused of crime. It may be done by direct
or indirect or circumstantial evidence. It may
be done by oral or demonstrative evidence.
... The proof of identity... need not be
made positively or in a manner free of any
inconsistencies; as no class of testimony is
more uncertain than that relating to iden-
tity .... 156
One other possible defense to the admission of
11 This point is not well taken considering the value
of other types of scientific evidence in court, such as
x-rays, blood tests, and fingerprinting, without requir-
ing statutory authorization.
il2 Equivalent to judicial notice of the scientific
reliability of the radar speedmeter.
113 See Royal v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 883, 96
S.E.2d 812, 816 (1957). Constitutionality of statute
upheld in Dooley v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 32, 92
S.E.2d 348 (1956).
164 Text at n.84-85, supra.
155 11 Am. JuR. PRoor or FACTS, SPEED, Surp. at
17 (1966). See Commonwealth v. Bartley, 411 Pa. 286,
191 A.2d 673 (1963) where police officer's testimony
that he knew exact spot radar beam first picked up
objects, and that he saw defendant's vehicle approach
spot, was held sufficient to rebut contention that since
defendant's vehicle was one of five in a line, the officer
could not be certain which vehicle was in violation of
the speed ordinance.
16 1 A.XANDER, supra n.144 at §246 at 799. See also
People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1954).
radar evidence relates to the arrest itself in juris-
dictions where an officer is forbidden to make an
arrest without a warrant unless the offense is
committed "in his presence".ln The problem arises
where the arresting officer in the "pickup car" is
relying solely on the radio message of his partner,
and not on his own knowedge.Ins This problem has
never been resolved in a reported case.
The final area of discussion of scientific evidence
in traffic cases assumes admissibility. The question
then becomes what weight is to be accorded this
evidence in deciding the case. Is it merely pre-
sumptive evidence of guilt rebuttable by the
defense, or is it, in practical effect, conclusive?
Considering first the chemical tests, it must be
noted that several states have statutes sanctioning
the use of the chemical tests, and establishing
their results as presumptive evidence. Most states
have simply incorporated the standard set by the
Uniform Vehicle Code. 59 However, some states
give prima facie effect to the results which "sets
up a permissive presumption of fact, rather than
directing a presumption of law" as recommended
in the Uniform Vehicle Code. 6' In either case, it
is important to remember that none of the results
are conclusive;'6 that it is always open to the
motorist to bring in countervailing evidence of
his sobriety. It is for this reason that law enforce-
ment agencies, in making arrests for drunken
driving, follow a well planned procedure aimed
at recording all relevant information concerning
the defendant's conduct at the time of arrest. The
observation of clinical symptoms of drunkenness
may often weigh as heavily as the percentage of
alcoholic concentration in the blood.
The types of countervailing evidence the de-
fendant may also involve the practical problems
of chemical testing. One such problem occurs when
117TENNESSEE CODE §11536 (1954) discussed in 23
TENN. L. REv. 784, 795 (1954).
15S See VIRGNIA CODE §46-215.2(b) (1954) discussed
in 40 VA. L. REv. 809, 810 (1954) in which the arrest
is permitted by the "officer who received a radio
message from the officer who observed the speed of the
motor vehicle." See also 1 ALExANDER, supra n.144 at
§76 which suggests that such an arrest is "in the
presence of" the arresting officer. Id. at 431: "Personal
presence includes corporeal extension within the sphere
of sense perception.... Presence is not the same as
view."
159 See n.36.
160 DONIGAN, supra n.4 at 26.
161 See to this effect: State v. Roberts, 102 N.H. 414,
158 A.2d 458 (1960); People v. Miller, 357 Mich. 400,
98 N.W.2d 524 (1959); Toms v. State, 95 Okla.Cr. 60,
239 P.2d 812 (1952); Halloway v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R.
353, 175 S.W.2d 258 (1943).
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there is a time lapse between arrest and subsequent
testing. Since the percentage of blood alcohol
concentration in the blood at the time of arrest
in this case must be estimated, the motorist may
want to attack the validity of the "extrapolation"
process employed. Though most cases have ad-
mitted experts' estimates by extrapolation, 1 2 the
probative weight of the test result is lessened by
proof of a considerable time lapse.
Another problem is the great variance among
individuals. For example, each individual has a
different rate of elimination of blood alcohol. The
estimate by extrapolation, used in time lapse
cases, may be attacked on the ground that it is
applicable to the average person in normal physical
condition. "The person whose sobriety is in
issue may not be an average person," '6 and the
weight of the presumption of intoxication suffers
accordingly.
The individual variance problem also arises in
connection with the percentage of alcoholic
concentration in the blood. The impairment
percentage established by science, and accepted
by most courts, is based on an average individual.
Proof that the defendant is not an average person
with regard to alcoholic consumption might tip
the balance in his favor. An example of such proof
would be a showing that at the time of arrest,
the defendant's speech was dear, his clothes neat,
behavior proper, and that he was generally co-
operative and not argumentative. M Such evidence
may also weigh heavily against the prosecution's
"probable cause" requirement for compelling a
blood test under the Fourth Amendment.
161
The weight to be accorded chemical test results
is also limited by the fact that a prosecution for
driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor falls into the amorphous category of a
quasi-criminal proceeding. Guilt must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.16 6 The "presumption
61
2 See State v. Stairs, 143 Me. 245, 60 A.2d 141
(1948) where elapsed time was four hours, and estimate
admitted. See also Ray v. State, 233 Ind. 495, 120
N.E.2d 176 (1954); People v. Holmes, 2 Mich.App.
283, 139 N.W.2d 771 (1966); People v. Taylor, 152
Cal.App.2d 29, 312 P.2d 731 (1957). For more complete
list see DONoAN, supra n.4 at 46.
'6 DONiGAN, supra n.4 at 46.
'rA State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 168 A.2d 27 (1961).
Conversely, though, the prosecution may contend that
even though the blood alcohol concentration is below
the 0.10% (the presumptive level of "under the in-
fluence of" intoxicants in the Uniform Vehicle Code)
additional evidence may lead to the conclusion that
this person's driving ability was impaired.
161 See text at n.132-33, supra.
166 State v. Emery, 27 N.J. 348, 142 A.2d 874 (1958).
of innocence" 1 therefore will resolve all doubtful
questions of identity of the specimen, and accuracy
and reliability of the test results, in the favor of
the defendant.
"However, as the validity and value of chemical
tests become better known generally, there is a
noticeable trend on the part of some of our courts
to give more weight to chemical test evidence
and its probative force in establishing definite
impairment on the part of a motorist." ' Typical
of this trend is the opinion of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in a case already alluded to:
[tihe magistrate here, despite his finding that
the drunkometer test was properly adminis-
tered, said that he did not find the reading
sufficient, standing alone, to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. We have difficulty
understanding this conclusion in the light of
what we have already said. The judge may
have thought corroboration to be necessary to
maintain the strength of the presumption.
Such a view would not be correct.
169
Though human variances and personnel mistakes
presently cause us to withhold conclusive weight
to such evidence,
it may, of course, well be that in the none too
distant future experimentation along such
lines will be sufficiently advanced so that
specimens of blood which are found to contain
certain percentages of alcohol may be almost
conclusive on the question of intoxication in
cases where the samples have been properly
taken, accurately analyzed by competent
chemists .... 171
Radar speedmeter results have been accorded
more conclusive effect in court than chemical
tests. The reasons are two-fold. First, the radar
speedmeter has been held by many courts to be a
proper subject for judicial notice.1i 7 Secondly,
the individual variance problem encountered in
the chemical test cases is inapplicable here. Fur-
thermore, the radar speedmeter has been reluc-
167 See Gullies, Presumption of Innocence, Its Appli-
cabiliy to Prosecutions For Speeding Violations, 47 3.
CRim. L.C. & P.S. 64 (1958).
16 DoNiGA, supra n.4 at 31.
169 State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 170, 199 A.2d 809,
824 (1964).
170 Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 394,
291 N.W. 384 (1940).
171 See n.66, supra.
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